Recent Decisions by unknown
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 9
1969
Recent Decisions
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the
Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law
Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Recent Decisions, 4 U. Rich. L. Rev. 134 (1969).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol4/iss1/9
RECENT DECISIONS
Searches and Seizures-ELECTRONIc DEVICES-MISPLACED CONFIDENCE.
Under the fourth amendment evidence acquired by an illegal search
and seizure is inadmissible in both federal' and state2 prosecutions. 3 It
is not always easy, however, to determine a violation of the fourth
amendment, and this problem has become more acute with the introduc-
tion of sophisticated electronic devices into the field of crime preven-
tion.
In its first case involving an illegal search and seizure,4 the Supreme
Court of the United States was concerned with police violation of the
privacy of a man's home.' The Court, relying on common law decisions,
established a sacrosanct area, which, if unlawfully invaded, brought the
fourth amendment's ban against illegal searches and seizures into play.6
The effect of the decision was to establish the dual requirement of (1)
an invasion into (2) a constitutionally protected area for the amendment
to be violated.7
1 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
a Before the amendment itself was first interpreted, the Supreme Court had held that
the contents of mail were private and not subject to inspection by postal employees.
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). Contrary to this, objects falling within the plain
view of a non-trespassing officer are not protected. See, e.g., Harris v. United States,
390 U.S. 234 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364
U.S. 253 (1960); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559 (1927).4 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See generally Stengel, The Background
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 3 U. RicH. L.
REv. 278.
5 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
6 Privacy as it applies to search and seizure has been discussed in a great many cases.
See, e.g., Mancusi, Warden v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451,455 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1948); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 283 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
7 Judge Prettyman stated this proposition quite well when he said, ". . . The basic
premise of the prohibition against searches was . . . the common law right of a man
to privacy in his home. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16, 17 (D.C.
[1341
RECENT DECISIONS
With the increased use of electronic devices as a method of
law enforcement, the protective requirement of a physical invasion
into a constitutionally protected area lost its effectiveness.8 To main-
tain the individual's right of privacy in the face of sophisticated electronic
eavesdropping devices, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United State ex-
tended the protective veil of the fourth amendment to the person.'0 In
so doing, the Court specifically abrogated the necessity of a physical in-
vasion into a sacrosanct area." Yet the Katz decision did not hold that
all conversations were protected from a search and seizure. 2 Rather,
only those statements which an individual might reasonably expect to,
be private were deemed to fall under the protective wing of the fourth
amendment. 13 Thus, cases involving misplaced confidence have been
Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
8 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Court also held that conversa-
tions were not the subject of seizure. Id. at 464. See also, Kamisar, The Wiretapping-
Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44 Mum~. L. Rxv. 891, 912-13 (1960)
(attacking this limitation). The fourth amendment was later extended to c6over con-
versations. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). But the requirement of a
physical invasion, although liberalized, remained. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S..158
(1964) ("spike mike" attached to a party wall by use of a thumb tack held a vio-
lation); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 '(1961) ("spike mike" inserted into "a
party wall and making contact with a heating duct held a violation); Goldman "v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (placing of a detectaphone against the walls of a
private office not a violation); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (tapping
of telephone wires not a violation of the fourth amendment). ,
Two cases in which an informer either recorded or transmitted a conversation-by using
a concealed electronic device also show the necessity for a physical invasion. Lopez"t.
United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). In these
cases the petitioners had consented to the informer's entry into the-protected "area,"
and this along with agreement by the informer that the conversation could'be recorded
or monitored formed the bases for the Supreme Court's holdings that the fourth amerid-
ment was not violated.
9 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Supreme Court later stated that the holding in Katz, con-
cerning the fourth amendment's protection of persons, did not withdraw any. of the
protection extended by the amendment t6 the "area." Alderman v. United' States, 394-
U.S. 165 (1969).
10 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
11 Id. at 353. Here, Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, said:
[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people--and1
not simply "areas"-against unreasonable searches and seizuresir be&omes clear that
the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of-a physi-
cal intrusion into any given enclosure.
Therefore, while a person could knowingly .make words spoken in a constitutionally-
protected area public, he could also seek to "preserve as private" words emitted in a
public place. Id. at 351-52.
12 Id. at 351-52. See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 449 (1963) (Brennan
dissenting).1 3 United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1969). See generally Greena-
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held to be outside the scope of the fourth amendment's protection. 4
New constitutional questions have been raised, however, in situations
involving misplaced confidence as it applies to "bugged informers." Two
recent federal court decisions will serve to point out the confusion in
this area."
In United States v. Kaufer'6 the petitioner Kaufer offered a bribe to
an IRS agent. While another agent listened,' 7 the offeree accepted by tele-
phone, and scheduled a meeting with Kaufer. The two met in a subway
station, and the agent taped the conversation. In upholding Kaufer's
conviction, the Court held that the introduction of the agent's testimony
and the recorded conversation into evidence was properly admissible.
The Court reasoned that there was no illegal search and seizure, due to
the consent of one of the parties to the conversation, and the introduc-
tion of the tape was only corroborative evidence.18
walt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitor-
ing With the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLum. L. Rav. 189, 231
(1968); 5 HOUSTON L. REv. 990, 994 (1968).
14Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 302 (1966).
15 The Supreme Court recently ruled that Katz does not apply retroactively; there-
fore, these cases are not affected by the Katz ruling. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244
(1969). But at the time Kaufer and White were handed down, the Court's reasoning
was based on Katz. Consequently, the decisions were based on the merits of Katz
and present problems pertinent in future decisions.
16 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1969).
17Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957). The Supreme Court held that a
party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an ex-
tension phone and may allow a third person to listen to or record the conversation. Id.
at 110-11. The Kaufer Court cited the Rathbun case in disposing of Kaufer's contention
that the second agent's listening to the telephone conversation between Kaufer and the
officer violated the fourth amendment. United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550, 552 (2d
Cir. 1969).
A recent Virginia case presented a similar situation. Harmon v. Commonwealth, 166
S.E.2d 232 (1969). A telephone company executive attached a pen register to the phone
of the defendant, who was suspected of making obscene calls. The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that while a private individual may be guilty of trespass by acting
in this manner, there is no violation of the fourth amendment because the amendment
does not protect against private individuals acting on their own initiative. The court
also incorrectly reasoned that, due to Rathbun, the victim's consent to attaching the pen
register to the defendant's phone eliminated the interception qualification necessary for a
violation of the Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934). Id. at 235.
18 United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550, 551 (2d Cir. 1969). This reasoning was also
used in another recent federal case involving electronic eavesdropping. Velez v. United
States, 397 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1968). Here, both the informer and the eavesdropper
testified. The court called the eavesdropper's testimony corroboration and stated that it
had previously rejected the application of Katz to this situation. Dryden v. United
States, 391 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1968). But Dryden involved the tapping of a telephone
[Vol. 4:134
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United States v. White9 presented much the same problem. Two
government agents planted a transmitter on a consenting informer's
person, and overheard conversations taking place in defendant White's
home, car, place of business, and in the informer's home and car. Here
the Court overturned White's conviction, basing its holding on the ex-
tension of search and seizure protection to the person.2 ° The Court
stated that this extension made it impossible for anyone but White to
consent to the monitoring of his statements.2'
White and Kaufer, as well as other "bugged informer" cases,22 are
examples of cases involving misplaced confidence. In White the Court
stated "that an informer is a competent witness as to conversations and
dealings with a defendant."23 Therefore, even though a confidant
could memorize or actually record statements, he is limited to mere
repetition of those statements at the trial.2 But in these two cases the
actual "fruits" of the electronic search were introduced, in one by the
presentation of the tape, and in the other by the testimony of the eaves-
droppers, thereby making the situations more than mere repetition of
the misplaced confidence. White duly recognized this fact,2 5 but Kaufer
failed to make the distinction when it labelled the introduction of the
tape corroborative evidence 26
This approach in Kaufer places a premium on whether or not the in-
former testifies. Yet, whether he testifies or not should make no differ-
ence.27 From the viewpoint of the jury it is not the informer's testimony
that convicts the speaker. It is the tape or the eavesdropper's testimony
which convinces the jurors, and they are convinced irrespective of
whether or not the informer takes the stand .2  This is not to say, how-
conversation, a situation which comes under the reasonable risk theory. See Rathbun
v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 110-11 (1957). Katz has no application to Dryden, but it
does apply to Velez.19 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969).
2 0 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
21 United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 843-44 (7th Cir. 1969).
2 2 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
23 United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 846 (7th Cir. 1969).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 845-46.
26 United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550, 551 (2d Cir. 1969).
27 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 449 (1963) (Brennan dissenting).
28 Even though the majority in Lopez called the introduction of the tape corroborative
evidence (id. at 439), it relied on another case in which the informer did ,not testify.
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). The dissent in Lopez specifically denied
the importance of the informer-testifying by calling the tape independent evidence. .1d.
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ever, that the use of electronic devices is unconstitutional per se. Elec-
tronic eavesdropping is merely another method of conducting a search
and seizure,2" thereby making that use subject to the procedures fol-
lowed in other fourth amendment cases.80
While deferring to local law,3' the Supreme Court has, with few ex-
ceptions,32 always upheld the necessity for search warrants in federal
prosecutions.33 Electronic device cases fall into a grey area because to
inform the suspect would destroy any effective use of the device. 4 The
situation is likened to those in which "announcement would provoke the
escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence." 3
Recognition of this factual limitation does not compromise too greatly
the procedure generally followed in a search and seizure. The bugging
device may be used only when the precise and discriminate circum-
stances are set forth in the affidavit, 6 to insure that "the procedure of
at 448. Only Chief Justice Warren considered the fact that the informer testified in
Lopez important (id., Warren concurring), and it has been submitted that his reason-
ing was due not to the propriety of "bugging" under the Constitution, but rather to fair-
ness at the trial. Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping:
Surreptitious Monitoring With the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68
,COLUM. L. Rv. 189, 196-97 (1968).29 Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
30 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967) (government agents "bugged" a tele-
phone booth). Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, stated, "It is apparent that
the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that this restraint
was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer."
31 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1958).
32 See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (search of a car validly held
Tby police as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding); Warden v. Haden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
(search where suspect might escape before warrant issued); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966) (taking blood to prevent the dissipation of its alcoholic content);
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (contemporaneous search of the person
following a lawful arrest); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (search incident to a
valid arrest); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (search of a boat that could
be moved); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (search of a vehicle that
could be moved before a warrant was issued).
3 3 See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Stover v. California, 376 U.S. 483, reb. denied, 377 U.S.
940 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (concurring opinion);
Chapman v. United States, 364 U.S. 610 (1961); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253
(1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); Trupiano v. United States, 334
U.S. 699 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Taylor v. United States,
286 U.S. 1 (1932); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
84 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n. 16 (1967).
a5 Id.
36 Osborn v. United States, 385 US. 323, 329 (1966). See generally Schwartz, The
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antecedent justification that is central to the Fourth Amendment" 3 7 is
preserved. While adherence to these strict guidelines affords the speaker
protection similar to that which is present in conventional search warrant
situations,38 it also frees the government from undue inhibition.
Outside the conflict involved in such decisions as White and Kaufer
lies a broader theoretical problem created by the Katz decision. By ex-
tending search and seizure protection to the person,39 Katz invites the
assertion that the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination
is at issue rather than the fourth amendment's ban against unlawful
searches and seizures.40 More specifically, since the words spoken by
the defendant may eventually convict him, should not the fifth amend-
ment be invoked to protect against a recording of these incriminating
words? This argument may be refuted by a close examination of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the fifth amendment's protection.
Despite recent Supreme Court decisions extending effective implementa-
tion of the fifth amendment beyond criminal proceedings, 41 the essential
element of physical or psychological coercion must still be present to
invoke fifth amendment protection.4 There still must be a setting in
which the speaker's "freedom of action is curtailed," 4 and, to date,
electronic eavesdropping cases have not presented this factual setting.44
Legislation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of Law and Order, 67 Mim. L.
REv. 455, 463-66 (1969).37 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966).
3s Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967), noted in I Im. L.F. 250 (1967).
a9 Katz v. United States, 389 US. 347, 351 (1967).
40Besides the fourth and fifth amendments, there is also the possibility of a sixth
amendment problem. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). After the defend-
ant and a companion had been indicted and released on bail, and the defendent had re-
tained a lawyer, agents persuaded the companion to install a radio transmitter in his car,
thereby overhearing incriminating statements by Massiah. By holding that incriminat-
ing statements had been deliberately elicited from the defendant in the absence of an
attorney, Massiab established that under the sixth amendment, evidence obtained by an
outside agent after indictment is inadmissible. The decision also implies that evidence
obtained by the informer himself in such situations is also inadmissible. It has also been
speculated that if Miranda established that sixth amendment protection extends to cus-
todial interrogation rather than indictment, then informers could not be used at this
stage of the proceedings. 52 CoRNmL L.Q. 975, 992, 992 n. 112 (1967).
41 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
4 2 Id.; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304 (1966).
43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
44 In Miranda the Supreme Court held that custodial interrogation was based on psy-
chological coercion which in turn took away the defendant's feeling of freedom to speak
or not, as he saw fit. Id. at 467. This could lead to a desire to find that an informer,
merely by being an informer, places the suspect in custody, thereby bringing the suspect's
statement within the fifth amendment. Whether such situations will be declared custodial
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Although there is no compulsion evident in recent cases involving
electronic eavesdropping, 45 there has obviously been indiscriminate use
of these devices, thereby encroaching upon one's right of privacy. The
basis of the misplaced confidence cases is that the fourth amendment
protects reasonable expectations of privacy, but does not protect people
from the risk that those with whom they converse will cooperate with
the police.46 Another way of stating this proposition is that the speaker
has impliedly consented to the possibility of the confidant's repetition
of the conversation. But it is unreasonable to say that the speaker im-
pliedly consents to, or runs the risk of, an invasion of his privacy by an
electronic device without knowing of its presence. The Supreme Court
recognized this problem, and consequently limited the reasonableness of
electronic eavesdropping to those instances in which probable cause has
been demonstrated to an impartial judicial authority.47 In this way the
Court justified the invasion of an individual's right of privacy by elec-
tronic devices, and at the same time protected him from their indiscrim-
inate use.
Therefore, in absence of coercion, the theoretical basis of eavesdrop-
interrogation remains to be seen. But the determination of this question is unimportant,
because Miranda stated very clearly that the fifth amendment protects people "in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed from being compelled to in-
criminate themselves." Id. (emphasis added).
45 An important question regarding compulsion was raised by Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966), noted in 1967 Duix L.J. 366 (1967); 52 IowA L. REv. 344 (1967);
45 N.C. L. REv. 174 (1967); 44 TExAs L. REv. 1616 (1967); 14 U.CJLA. L. Rav. 680 (1967).
The majority held the taking of blood from the defendant was not compulsive self-
incrimination because the fifth amendment is limited to evidence of a testimonial or com-
municative nature. Mr. Justice Black dissented, saying this evidence was testimonial and
communicative because it provided testimony which served to convict Schmerber. In
principle Mr. justice Black has a valid point, but he declined to state the extent to which
he would follow this principle. Would he declare as inadmissible fingerprints, photo-
graphs, writing or speaking for identification, and all other uses of the body which had
been held as not part of the fifth amendment? Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
It appears that practicality must take precedence to principle in this instance. To adhere
to Mr. Justice Black's desires instead of limiting the amendment to evidence which is
testimonial or communicative in itself would allow too many known criminals to go
free. Furthermore, to hold that the blood taken from Schmerber's body is not com-
municative under the fifth amendment is not spurious reasoning. Unlike speech, papers,
or even lie-detector tests, the accused himself was not compelled to indicate the degree
or knowledge of his guilt. The test did not depend upon his testimonial or communica-
tive response. Therefore, unlike the other situations, no reliance for conviction was
placed upon his own knowledge.46 See note 14 supra.
47 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 356 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323, 329-30 (1966).
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ping cases rests on the right of privacy, not self-incrimination. To
hold otherwise would allow a person to be protected not in spite of his
incriminating statements, but because of those statements. Yet, by basing
these cases on the circumstances surrounding the statements, rather than
on the statements themselves, both the individual's rights and effective
law enforcement are protected. The individual is protected from un-
reasonable search and seizure, and the government has the ability to make
use of electronic eavesdropping as a basically sound method of law en-
forcement.
D.P.B.
48 Judge Prettyman stated this proposition quite well when he said, ... The basic
premise of the prohibition against searches was not protection against self-incrimina-
tion; it was the common law right of a man to privacy in his home.. ." District of
Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1
(1950). Mr. Justice Stewart merely added "and his person" to Judge Prettyman's state-
ment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Infants-Retrial As Adult-REDMON v. PEYTON
Juvenile courts were established in order to provide a separate sys-
tem of justice to protect and rehabilitate, rather than to punish, mis-
guided child offenders.- Realizing, however, that some juveniles are
more mature and, at the same time, less amenable to such corrective
measures than others, Virginia, like many states,2 provides a procedure
whereby the juvenile court, upon a preliminary hearing and investiga-
tion, can "waive" its jurisdiction over a juvenile above a certain age3
and certify him to a court of record to be tried as an adult.' The power
of the adult court in this instance is derived from, and dependent en-
tirely upon, the proper waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court.5
Consequently, if it be discovered either before or after an adult court
conviction that the proper certification procedure has not been com-
plied with, the defendant, if still a juvenile, is remanded to the juvenile
court for all procedures to begin anew.6 If, on the other hand, the
defendant has reached majority, the juvenile court under present Vir-
ginia law looses all authority over him.7 Recognizing this shortcoming,
Virginia has in past decisions held that one in such a situation can be
retried on new indictments as an adult.8 Recently, however, in the.
'See, e.g., Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 844, 97 S.E.2d 14, 21 (1957); Mack,
The juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 107-12, 119-20 (1909); Paulsen, Kent v.
United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167,
173-74.
2See generally Wade v. Warden of State Prison, 145 Me. 120, 73 A.2d 128 (1950);
State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d 696 (1960); Trujillo v. State, 74 N.M.
618, 447 P.2d 279 (1968); Ex parte Lewis, 85 Okla. Crim. 322, 188 P.2d 367 (1947).
3The age is fourteen in Virginia as stipulated in the statute quoted in note 4 infra.4 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-176 (1960) provides in part as follows:
. . . if a child fourteen years of age or over is charged with an offense which,
if committed by an adult, could be punishable by confinement in the peni-
tentiary the court after an investigation ... , and hearing thereon may, in its
discretion, retain jurisdiction or certify such child for proper criminal pro-
ceedings to the appropriate court of record having criminal jurisdiction of such
offenses if committed by an adult....
5 See, e.g, Pruitt v. Peyton, 209 Va. 532, 165 S.E.2d 288 (1969); Peyton v. French,
207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739 (1966); Norwood v. City of Richmond, 203 Va. 886,
128 S.E.2d 425 (1962); Tilton v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 774, 85 S.E.2d 368 (1955).
GSee, e.g., Norwood v. City of Richmond, 203 Va. 886, 128 S.E.2d 425 (1962);
Tilton v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 774, 85 SE.2d 368 (1955).
7 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-159 (1960) provides in part as follows:
When jurisdiction has been obtained by the court in the case of any child,
such jurisdiction may be retained or reassumed by the court until the child
becomes twenty-one years of age....8 See Pruitt v. Peyton, 209 Va. 532, 165 S.E.2d 288 (1969); Peyton v. French, 207
Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739 (1966).
[142]
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case of Redmon v. Peyton,9 a federal court has ruled such a retrial to
be unconstitutional.10
In Redmon, the petitioner, age fifteen, was arrested on charges of
stealing an automobile in Gloucester County, Virginia. Some months
later he was convicted of grand larceny by the circuit court and sen-
tenced to serve two years in the state penitentiary. After being released
from prison, Redmon was convicted and sentenced several more times,
culminating in his being convicted as a third offender under Virginia's
recidivist statute." On finding that there was no state remedy available
to attack the recidivist conviction,'" Redmon petitioned the federal
district court for a writ of habeas corpus.13 The court, in granting the
petition, found that the grand larceny conviction 4 was not preceded
by a proper certification from the juvenile court and was, therefore,
void for lack of jurisdiction.' 5 Whether or not this finding is a correct
one is, in itself, an interesting, 16 though far less significant, topic than
9298 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Va. 1969), notice of appeal filed, E.D. Va., May 19, 1969.
(The appellant was given by order dated June 17, 1969, ninety days from May 19,
1969, in which to docket his appeal with the Fourth Circuit.)
10 Id. at 1127.
11 VA. CODE ANN. § 53-296 (1967).
12 Sentence on the recidivist conviction was to begin after the completion of all
sentences currently being served. When Redmon filed his petition with the district
court on Dec. 5, 1966, he was still serving a prior sentence for forgery. At that
time Virginia provided no method to attack a conviction unless the sentence on it
was being presently served. Although later in 1968 Virginia enacted legislation al-
lowing one to attack a sentence to be served in. the future [VIRGINIA CODE ANN. § 8-596
(b) (3) (Cum. Supp. 1968)], the district court reasoned that exhaustion being a rule
of comity and not of law, it would continue with the case.
l Redmon first petitioned the court on December 5, 1966. The court dismissed the
petition, whereupon Redmon appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit on July 23, 1968, remanded the case to the
district court to hear allegations as to the convictions leading up to the recidivist
conviction and sentence, which even though fully served, still constituted a "present
burden" upon the petitioner.
14The court also ruled that another of the three convictions (unauthorized use
of an automobile), should be vacated, but for entirely different reasons.
15 Redmon v. Peyton, 298 F. Supp., 1123, 1126-27 (1969).
16 The court in Redmon states:
.... [N]o . . . . hearing was ever had in the Juvenile Court of Gloucester
County. Rather, the Circuit Court took jurisdiction and used an investigative
report from an earlier juvenile hearing to determine if Redmon should be tried
as an adult. Id. at 1126.
An examination of the above statement in light of the lower court records reveals
that the court confused the facts leading up to the grand larceny conviction with those
of another conviction on the same date. What actually occurred was that after a
hearing, but without an investigation by the juvenile court, Redmon was certified
to the circuit court. Commonwealth v. Redmon, Order B-426 (Oct. 31, 1956). The
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the court's self-imposed problem 7 concerning the propriety of retrying
Redmon on new indictments. As to this final question, the court, after
circuit court, purportedly relying on VA. CODE AN. § 16.1-175 (1960), conducted its own
investigation and, afterwards, on Jan. 7, 1957, adjudged Redmon guilty of grand
larceny. Commonwealth v. Redmond [sic], Cir. Ct. No. 944, C. L. Order Bk. 14, at
294 (Jan. 7, 1957). Setting of sentence was suspended until July 1, 1957, with Redmon
to remain on probation until then. Id. at 304.
Soon, however, Redmon got into more trouble, whereupon the court on April 2,
1957, after finding that he had violated the conditions of his parole, revoked the
prior suspension of punishment, entered an order of conviction, and sentenced Red-
mon to serve two years in the penitentiary. Id. at 340. Also, on April 2, 1957, the
court entered a separate conviction order against Redmon for statutory burglary,
with sentence set to run concurrently with the one for grand larceny. Commonwealth
v. Redmond [sic], Felony No. 952, C. L. Order Bk. 14, at 340 (April 2, 1957). The
statutory burglary conviction was preceded by neither a hearing nor an investiga-
tion in the juvenile court, indicating perhaps that the court in Redmon confused this
conviction, which was in no way a part of the recidivist conviction, with the grand
larceny conviction. See the notice of hearing (Jan. 8, 1965) as part of the record in
Commonwealth v. Redmon, OB-70, at 247 (Jan. 27, 1965). The latter was, in fact,
preceded by a hearing and investigation, even though it was conducted by the
circuit court, rather than the juvenile court.
Ordinarily, a court's misconception of the facts would render irrelevant any dis-
cussion of its interpretation of a statute applicable to them. Since, however, the
particular statute concerned [VA. CoDon ANNm. § 16.1-175 (1960)] applies to situations
where a circuit court carries out its own investigation pursuant to a prior juvenile
court hearing, as well as to situations where such an investigation is conducted with-
out any prior juvenile court proceedings whatsoever, the court's final conclusion
that the conviction was void for lack of jurisdiction is not ipso facto incorrect.
The court interpreted the above mentioned statute as allowing a court to conduct
its own investigation, but only on occasions when such court is at the commencement
of the trial under the mistaken belief that the defendant was over the age of eighteen.
Whether or not this interpretation of legislative intent is accurate is, however, im-
material, for prior to Rednzon, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had already
determined the legislative intent of this statute. Toran v. Peyton, 207 Va. 923, 153
S.E.2d 213 (1967). Toran held that VA. CoDE ANN. § 16.1-175 (1960) allows a court of
record, instead of the juvenile court, to conduct an investigation, as stipulated in VA.
CoDE ANN. § 16.1-176 (b) (1960), in any case, regardless of whether or not the circuit
court thinks that the defendant is an adult. Although this might not be the correct
interpretation of legislative intent, it is, nevertheless, binding on all courts, including
the federal court in Redmon, which only has the power to decide whether or not
the statute is constitutional. See Hill v. Peyton, 271 F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Va. 1967), aff'd,
No. 11846, (4th Cir. 1968). It thus appears, in light of the actual facts involved and
the applicability of Toran to them, that there was no error committed in certifying
Redmon to the adult court. Providing these discrepancies are brought out on appeal,
it would further appear that Redmon should be reversed.
17The court did not actually have to decide this issue, since Redmon had al-
ready fully served his sentence for grand larceny. Any new conviction and sentence
for an offense in which sentence has already been fully served under a previous
conviction is, of course, double jeopardy. However, it is in no way certain that
either this point or even the points discussed in note 15 supra will be raised by the
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first noting that the juvenile courts were no longer open to the then
adult petitioner, reasoned that to retry him in any other court would
merely serve to deny him, for a second time, his privilege of being pro-
ceeded against as a juvenile and would, as a result, amount to a further
violation of his constitutional rights.'8
Although recent United States Supreme Court decisions have held
it to be a violation of due process for a juvenile court under the
guise of "rehabilitation" or "protection" to deny a juvenile offender
certain of the same basic rights guaranteed an adult,'9 Redmon is the
first case to hold that a denial of the statutory rights peculiar to juve-
niles is a basis for federal intervention. 0 Such intervention was neces-
sitated by a long line of cases,2' including two from Virginia,22 per-
mitting an adult retrial in a situation similar to Redmon's. These deci-
sions were based on the rule that the defendant's age either at the
time of trial or at the time legal proceedings are instituted against him,
rather than his age at the time the offense is committed, determines
whether he will be tried in a juvenile or an adult court. Regardless
of whether or not such a rule is valid,24 it is apparent that to try one
in an adult court for an offense, which at the time of commission is re-
respondent on appeal. Instead, the respondent may contest only the validity of the
coures ultimate ruling, since a reversal on other grounds would merely delay the
decision of a matter certain to come up again in the near future. See, e.g, Pruitt v.
Peyton, 209 Va. 532, 165 S.E.2d 288 (1969).
I8 Redmon v. Peyton, 298 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (1969).
19 See In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341 (1968); In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). That case dealt with the waiver of
a juvenile to an adult court in the District of Columbia, and although the court
hinted that it might have decided the case on constitutional grounds if it had been
forced to, it expressly declined to do so, choosing rather to decide the case in -its
appellate capacity for the District of Columbia, and to apply an applicable District
of Columbia statute similar to Virginia's (outlined in note 4 supra). Id. at 556. How-
ever, for a review of some of the many different interpretations of Kent, see 1 Juv.
CT. DiG. No. 3., at 4-8 (1968).21See, e.g., People v. Carlson, 360 Mich. 651, 104 N.W.2d 753 (1960); State v.
Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d 696 (1960); Wheeler v. Shoemake, 213 -Miss.
374, 57 So.2d 267 (1952); MoLaren v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 31, 207 S.W. 669 (1919)..
2 2 Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739 (1969), citing State v. Dehier,
257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d 696 (1960); Pruitt v. Peyton, 209 Va. 532, 165 S.E.2d
288 (1969), relying upon Peyton v. French 207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739 (1969).
2 3 See cases cited note 20 supra.
24 Several cases have followed the rule that the defendant's age at the time the
offense was committed determines whether he will be tried in a juvenile court or
an adult court. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 141 F. Supp. 641 (ED. Va. '1956);
Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 156 NE.2d 649 (1959); State v. Jones,' 220
Tenn. 477, 418 S.W.2d 769 (1965).
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viewable only by a juvenile court, is to take away his right to be pro-
tected merely because of the passage of time.25 Thus, the court in Red-
mon was correct in holding that such a retrial would be a violation of
one's right to the equal protection of the laws under the United States
Constitution.2 6 Accordingly, the court made it clear that it will no longer
tolerate such practice
If Redmon appears insignificant for the reason that such an unusual
factual situation is unlikely to recur, examine its extension to a far
more probable situation where a juvenile commits a crime and avoids
trial altogether until reaching majority.28 Although the court in Red-
mon does not even mention the possibility of such an extension, since
retrial of a defendant in either situation would deny him his right
to be tried as a juvenile merely because of the passage of time, such an
extension necessarily follows from the court's reasoning."
Some jurisdictions, in handling situations similar to the ones posed
by Redmon, remand the case to the adult court for a new and properly
conducted waiver hearing and investigation."0 If at this hearing it is
decided that the juvenile was inappropriately "waived" to the adult
court, then the conviction is vacated.3 1 However, if it is decided that
jurisdiction was appropriately "waived", the subsequent adult convic-
tion may be re-instated.32 Although such a procedure allows the state
to proceed further with the ensuing possibility that the original adult
court conviction will ultimately be given effect, it places on the adult
court the burden of deciding a question that was primarily intended
for the more experienced and better equipped juvenile court to answer.
2 5 See Redmon v. Peyton, 298 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (1969).
26 U. S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
Although the court mentions due process, it for the most part does so only in
asserting its relation to equal protection, the concept on which the court finally seems
to rest its decision. Redmon v. Peyton, 298 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (1969).
2 7 Redmon v. Peyton, 298 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (1969).2 8 Although the two situations are distinguishable on the basis that in one it's the
error of the court and in the other it's the defendant's evasion of the police that
allows time to escape before the proper juvenile proceedings have taken place, no
case has deemed such a distinction worthy of consideration. Indeed, several cases,
in concluding that retrial as an adult should be allowed, have done so, in part at
least, on the basis that any attempt to distinguish the two cases would be merely
superficial. See, e.g., State v. Dehler, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d 696, 702 (1960).29 See generally Redmon v. Peyton, 298 F. Supp. 1123, 1127-28 (1969).
30 See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 564-65 (1966).
31 Id. at 565.
S Id.
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The best way for a state to solve the dilemma is to revise its present
juvenile statutes in order to eliminate any provisions that imposes a
maximum age limit upon which a, juvenile court can retain jurisdiction
over a juvenile offender. Such an enactment would allow the upper
court to remand the case to the ,juvenile court, rather than the ill-
equipped adult court,8" to conduct a new and proper hearing for the
purpose of determining whether jurisdiction was appropriately waived.
It would also allow the juvenile court, in situations where the defen-
dant has never before been tried for an offense committed as a juve-
nile, to conduct a proper waiver hearing and determine whether he
might be tried as an adult." Guaranteed in either event would be the
upholding of the defendant's constitutional rights under the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment36
C. W. P., Jr.
3See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-159 (1960).
34 Apparently, however, the Virginia legislature feels that the adult court is ade-
quately equipped to conduct, in some instances at least, its own investigation to de-
cide the issue of waiver. See VA. CoDE ANw. § 16.1.-175 (1960). For cases construing
this statute, see Toran v. Peyton, 207 Va. 923, 153 S.E.2d 213 (1967), and Tilton v.
Commonwealth, 196 Va. 774, 85 S.E.2d 368 (1955).
3 If in either situation the juvenile court finds that jurisdiction cannot be ap-
propriately waived, the case should be dismissed. It is pointless to try the now adult
defendant as a juvenile, since he is no longer amenable to juvenile correction methods.
86The closer a juvenile is to his majority, the more probable it is that a juvenile
court will certify him to be tried as an adult. Therefore, the juvenile court must be
restricted to decide the issue of waiver in light of the defendant's age and personality
at the time of the original hearing, or in a case where there was no previous hearing,
at the time of the offense. Undoubtedly, there will be times when not enough facts
are available to adequately make such a decision, in which case the court must
as a matter of law, rule that waiver is inappropriate. But unless such a restriction
is invoked, the court will again be punishing one merely because of the passage
of time.
Statute of Limitations for Personal Irijuries-FouR-YEAR U.C.C.
STATUTE OR Two-YEAR VIRGINIA STATUTE?
In Virginia warranty and negligence have traditionally been con-
sidered two distinct forms of legal action, the first sounding in contract,
the second in tort.' The applicable statute of limitations for both, how-
ever, begins to run when a cause of action accrues, irrespective of the
wronged party's knowledge or reason to know of the damage or injury
complained of.2
A cause of action for breach of warranty arises when the contractual
standards are not met and there is a resulting injury to an interest of the
obligee to the contract 3 In a sale of goods the cause of action arises
when either tender of delivery is made or when the product is installed.4
Vhere the alleged breach results from the rendition of services, the cause
of action arises when the work is accepted.'
A cause of action in tort for negligence arises when the defendant,
owing a duty to the plaintiff, breaches this duty in such a way that the
breach causes injury or damage to the plaintiff." The Virginia court has
consistently held that a plaintiff need not know nor have reason to know
of an injury, in order for this cause of action to accrue and start the ap-
1Brockett v. Harrell Bros., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965); Swift & Co. v. Wells,
201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959); Blythe v. Camp Mfg. Co., 183 Va. 432, 25 S.E.2d 254
(1945).
2 Owens v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 257 (E.D.Va. 1967); Hawks v.
DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966); Weaver v. Beneficial Finance Co., 199
Va. 196, 98 S.E.2d 687 (1957); Seymour and Burford Corp. v. Richardson, 194 Va. 709,
75 S.E.2d 77 (1953); Page v. Shenandoah Life Insurance Co., 185 Va.. 919, 40 S.E.2d 922
(1947); Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 195 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271 (1945); G. L.
Webster Co. v. Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d 305 (1939); Louisville & Nashville Ry.
Co. v. Saltzer, 151 Va. 165, 144 S. E. 456 (1928); Southern Ry. Co. v. Leake, 140 Va. 439,
125 S.E. 314 (1924); Huston v. Cantril, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 142 (1840).
3 See cases cited notes 4, 5, 6 supra. See also Newbern v. Joseph Baker & Co., 147 Va.
996, 133 S.E. 500 (1926); Jacot v. Grossmann Seed & Supply Co., 115 Va. 90, 78 S.E. 646
(1913).
4 Owens v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 257 (E.D.Va. 1967); Matlack,
Inc. v. Butler, 253 F. Supp. 972 (E.D.Pa. 1966); Howard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 248
F. Supp. 527 (S.D.W. Va. 1965); Rufo v. Bastian Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823
(1965); VA. CoDE ANN. S 8.2-725 (1965).
5 Richmond Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Laburnum Construction Co., 195
Va. 827, 80 S.E.2d 574 (1954).
6 Balderson v. Robertson, 203 Va. 484, 125 S.E.2d 180 (1962); Seymour and Burford
Corp. v. Richardson, 194 Va. 709, 75 S.E.2d 77 (1953); Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co.,
192 Va. 776, 66 S.E.2d 441 (1951); Stephens v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 184 Va. 94,




plicable statute of limitations running.7 Yet where no injury has resulted,
a negligent act alone will not create a cause of action nor start the
statute of limitations running.8
Damages for personal injuries are recoverable in Virginia in war-
ranty' and negligence actions, but the statute of limitations for both
is the same. The Virginia court has held that all actions for personal in-
juries must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of
action.' 0
Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Virginia law
in Sides v. Richard Machine Works, Inc.,"' rendered a decision that will
have a noticeable impact on personal injury actions in Virginia. The
plaintiff, Sides, was injured in 1966 while operating a locomotive in his
employer's plant. The locomotive was manufactured by the defendant
and purchased by the plaintiff's employer in 1958. Sides brought his
action in negligence against the manufacturer within two years of his
injury, but more than nine years after the date of the sale of the loco-
motive. In allowing recovery, the court held that the defendant's negli-
7 Hawkes v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966); Street v. Consumers Mining
Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271 (1945); Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Saltzer, 151
Va. 165, 144 S.E. 456 (1928); Southern Ry. Co. v. Leake, 140 Va. 439, 125 S.E. 314 (1924).
Contra, Urie v. Thompson, 377 U.S. 163 (1949); Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234
(5th Cir. 1962); Prince v. U. of Pa., 282 F. Supp. 832 (E.D.Pa. 1968); 63 HARV. L. REv.
1177 at 1204-205 (1950).
S Southern Ry. Co. v. Leake, 140 Va. 439, 125 S.E. 314 (1924).
0Daniels v. Truck & Equipment Corp., 205 Va. 579, 139 S.E.2d 31 (1964); Cody v.
Norton, 110 Va. 363, 66 S.E. 33 (1909).
10Friedman v. Peoples Service Drug Co., 208 Va. 700, 160 S.E.2d 563 (1968). The
court held that the recovery sought, rather than the form of the action, determines the
applicable statute of limitations. The practical result was that VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24
(1950), which provides in part that, ' Every action for personal injuries shall be brought
within two years next after the right to bring the action shall have accrued," controlled
in all actions to recover for personal injuries, whether the action be in negligence or
warranty. VA. CODE: Am. § 8-13 (Supp. 1968), therefore, never controls where re-
covery for personal injuries is sought in warranty.
An apparent conflict in Virginia law must be noted. The court in Friedman held that
all actions to recover for personal injuries must be brought within two years of the
accrual of the cause of action. The Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Virginia
clearly allows four years in which to bring an action for personal injuries that are con-
sequential to the breach of the sales contract. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.2-715 (1965) and VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.2-725 (1965). These positions are, however, reconcilable. The factual
situation in Friedman involved a cause of action accruing before Jan. 1, 1966, the effec-
tive date of the U.C.C. in Virginia. Furthermore, as amended the general statute of
limitations for contract actions has yielded to the U.C.C. whenever the U.C.C. is applica-
ble. VA. CODE Aax. § 8-13 (Supp. 1968). The present situation is that personal injuries
are recoverable under the U.C.C. within four years of the breach of warranty.
"1406 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969).
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gence was not actionable until the plaintiff was injured, and since the
statute of limitations controlling actions for personal injuries began run-
ning on the day of the injury, Sides' action was timely brought.
It is important to note that in Sides, recovery was allowed solely on the
basis of negligence. Had the action been brought in warranty under the
law controlling at the time, recovery would have been barred in 1960,
two years after the breach occurred and six years before the plaintiff
was injured.12 Had the action been brought under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, the cause of action would have accrued in 1958 and been
barred in 1962.13
The fundamental significance of Sides was that recovery was allowed
in negligence rather than warranty. If the identical factual situation
arose today in Virginia, an action could be brought in warranty under
the Uniform Commercial Code, as well as in negligence. This plurality
of methods of relief has presented problems that Virginia will have to
resolve. Other courts have held that negligence actions and warranty
actions under the Uniform Commercial Code are quite different, even
when relied on to recover for personal injuries.1 4 It has been held, how-
ever, that when the action is brought under the Uniform Commercial
Code, that law as adopted should control exclusively. 5
The result of Sides in Virginia is that a plaintiff in all actions to re-
cover for personal injuries caused by a defective product may have an
election of methods with which to proceed against the manufacturer.
12 See cases cited notes 3, 4 supra. The breach would have occurred in 1958 when the
locomotive was delivered and the action in warranty would have been barred two years
thereafter under Friedman.
13 Under Virginia law, a cause of action for breach of warranty occurs when delivery
is made unless the warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods. VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.2-725 (1965). An action for personal injuries brought in warranty is per-
missible if the injuries are consequential to the breach. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-715 (1965).
This action, however, could have been brought within four years of the breach or until
1962.
14 Matlack Inc. v. Butler,- 253 F. Supp. 972 (E.D.Pa. 1966); Rosenau v. New Brunswick,
51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
15 The four-year period in which to bring an action under U.C.C. § 2.725 controls
whether the action in warranty be for personal injuries or for property damage. Lewis
v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 245 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Mich. 1965); Gardiner v.
Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964). The four-year period under
the U.C.C. superceded an 1895 two-year period of limitation. Engleman v. Eastern Light
Co., 30 Pa. D. & C.2d (1962). The four-year period under the U.C.C. was not a
matter of substantive right; thus where the question was whether to use the U.C.C. as
adopted by one state as opposed to the common law in another, the common law should
prevail. Natale v. Upjohn Co, 236 F. Supp. 37 (D.C. Del. 1964), aff'd, 356 F.2d 590 (3rd
Cir. 1964). See also cases cited note 10 supra.
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This election depends on the time when the alleged injury is caused. Jf
the injury occurs one year after the delivery of the product, the plain-
tiff will have two years in which to bring an action in negligence or
three years in warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code.16 If the
injury occurs two years after the delivery of the defective product,
then recovery must be sought within two years in either warranty or
negligence. If the injury is caused by the defective product more than
four years after its delivery, then the only relief would be under the
theory of outstanding negligence used in Sides.
The concept of outstanding negligence is a strict adherence to the
principle that negligence which causes no injury is not actionable.'7
The result of the concept is that years after a negligent act has been
committed it may cause an injury and then become actionable.', The
period that this negligence remains in the abstract conceivably could be
decades after its inception, and yet, if a causal connection be found
between the negligence and the injury, recovery could be had long
.after any action in warranty had been barred.
Outstanding negligence is not a novel theory in the law. 9 Its use in
Sides v. Richard Machine Works, Inc., however, is a recognition of an
additional path of recovery for a plaintiff who has sustained personal
injuries. The theory of outstanding negligence facilitates recovery by
obviating problems involving statutes of limitation that would otherwise
bar recovery. This result is consistent with the present trend toward
strict liability"0 but it is not a true extension of this trend. Strict lia-
bility is liability without fault whether the approach be in tort2 ' or con-
tract,22 whereas liability based on outstanding negligence still requires the
element of fault. The ultimate effect of Sides is, therefore, to run the
16 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-725 (1965).
17 See cases cited notes 7, 8, 9 supra.
I8 Accord, Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 406 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1969). See Howard
v. United Fuel Gas Co., 248 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.W.Va. 1965); Rodibaugh v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 225 Cal. App. 2d 570, 37 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1964); Gile v. Sears, Roe-
buck and Co., 281 App. Div. 95, 120 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1952); Theurer v. Condon, 34 Wash.
2d 448, 209 P.2d 311 (1949).
19 See cases cited notes 9, 21 supra.
2 OProsser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 M Nu. L.
REv. 791 (1966).
21 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963); RrATEAMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRts § 402 A (1965).
22 Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959). See also Higbee v. Giant
Food Shopping Center, 106 F. Supp. 586 (E.D.Va. 1952); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318(1'965)..,
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statute of limitations indefinitely until the defendant's fault causes an
injury.*
C. L. W.
*Editor's Note-Since the writing of this article, the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has dealt with a factual situation analagous to that in Sides. See Caudill v.
Wise Rambler Inc. and American Motors Corp., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969). The
court held that an action to recover for personal injuries caused by breach of an im-
plied warranty was timely brought within two years of the injury, even though brought
more than two years after the sale of the automobile.
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